With
the end of the Cold War, in which the model of UN executive action
outlined in yesterday's post developed, the concept of security, and the
ends to which conflict prevention machinery of the
United Nations was
to be put, became more ambitious:
► Peacekeeping became established as a core technique of international executive action;
► Civilian administration became significantly more ambitious in scope and scale; and
► UN agencies in the humanitarian field began to exercise an increasing range of governmental powers.
With
the expansion in the scope and complexity of international operations,
it became clear that existing political and legal concepts could not
address the questions about legitimacy, authority and credibility to
which that expansion gave rise.
(photo credit)
Both the achievements and the
failures of UN operations during the 1990s placed the legitimacy of
international executive action on the table:
► In cases seen as success stories, such as
East Timor and
Kosovo,
local actors challenged the legitimacy of the authority exercised by
international administrators, asking why the UN, rather than the people,
should have the authority to decide who should govern?
► In cases of failure, such as
Rwanda and
Srebrenica,
critics asked why the UN alone should have the authority to intervene
in order to protect populations at risk if other external actors could
do so more effectively?
Many of the debates about the legitimacy of international authority came to a head in 1999 when
NATO intervened in Kosovo without Security Council authorisation. That intervention challenged not only the authority of sovereign states, but also that of the UN.
Development of responsibility to protect
The development of the
responsibility to protect
concept can be understood as an attempt to answer these growing
questions about the basis of both state and international authority.
(Prior IntLawGrrls
posts)
Conceptually,
the responsibility to protect asserts that the lawfulness of authority –
both local and international – flows from the factual capacity and
willingness to guarantee protection to the inhabitants of a territory.
This argument for the lawfulness of authority does not prioritise
self-determination, popular sovereignty, or other romantic or
nationalist bases for determining who should have the power to govern in
a particular territory. Rather, it asserts that authority, to be
recognised and respected, must be effective at guaranteeing protection.
Practically,
the implementation of the concept is aimed at strengthening the UN’s
capacity to protect. In a series of reports on implementing the
responsibility to protect concept, the Secretary-General has stressed
that implementation will involve ‘utilizing the whole prevention and
protection tool kit available to the United Nations system’, adopting a
‘unifying perspective’ and facilitating ‘system-wide coherence’, and
expanding and refocusing the UN’s ‘early warning and assessment
capacities’. Implementation of the concept thus involves further
consolidating and integrating the techniques of executive action
initiated by
Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, and discussed in yesterday's post.
Normative significance
What,
then, does thinking about the responsibility to protect concept in
light of this history suggest about its normative significance?