Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction Study

Amnesty International has recently conducted a massive review of universal jurisdiction legislation around the world. The study was launched in connection with discussions occurring within the Sixth (Legal ) Committee of the General Assembly prompted by the Tanzanian delegation (see also here for 2010 discussions and here for 2011 discussions). In its study, Amnesty defined “universal jurisdiction” as

the ability of the court of any state to try persons for crimes committed outside its territory that are not linked to the state by the nationality of the suspect or the victims or by harm to the state’s own national interested.
Some key findings:
1. 85% of the 193 UN states have defined one or more of the core international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture) within their domestic law. (So long as any one crime against humanity or war crimes was prosecutable, the state is included in these statistics). These statistics break down as follows:
  • War Crimes: 72% of states have at least one war crime as a crime under national law and 69% of all states provide for universal jurisdiction over such crimes
  • Crimes Against Humanity: 46% have at least one crimes against humanity as a crime under national law and 40% of all states provide for universal jurisdiction over such crimes.
  • Genocide: 60% of states have genocide on the books.
  • Torture: 49% have included torture as a separate crime under national law, and 44% allow for universal jurisdiction.
  • Other crimes that might be subject to universal jurisdition (piracy, trafficking, and terrorism, e.g.) are not surveyed.
2. 75% of states have provided for universal jurisdiction over one or more of these crimes.

3. 47% provide for universal jurisdiction over “ordinary crimes.”

4. In total, 84% of states can exercise universal jurisdiction over certain international and domestic crimes.

5. States often incorporate incomplete or incorrect definitions of international crimes into their domestic codes.

6. Very few states have actually invoked universal jurisdiction since WWII (the study lists: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US).

7. The study cites only one instance (the Cavallo case) in which an individual has been extradited to a state prosecuting pursuant to universal jurisdiction.

The study notes that there are many ways that states can incorporate universal jurisdiction into their domestic systems. These include:
  • Defining the crime within domestic law and then referring to treaty obligations to prosecute (or extradite).
  • Defining the crime within domestic law and then allowing for the assertion of jurisdiction over crimes contained within multilateral penal treaties that the state has joined, regardless of treaty obligations to prosecute.
  • Allowing for the assertion of jurisdiction over crimes contained within treaties, but not specifically defining the crime within domestic law.
  • Allowing for universal jurisdiction over ordinary crimes (usually serious crimes such as murder or rape).
  • Treating treaties as automatically part of domestic law (so-called monist states), but charging and sentencing individuals in accordance with analogous domestic crimes.

Nonetheless, the study notes that there are a number of obstacles to the effective use of the law that is on the books. These include:

1. The failure to define international crimes as domestic crimes

2. Inadequate definitions of crimes and principles of responsibility

3. The availability of defenses, such as superior orders, statutes of limitations, amnesty laws, pardons, and immunities

4. Presence requirements to open an investigation or seek the extradition of a suspect
5. Limiting the triggering of universal jurisdiction who are residents or nationals
6. Limiting the use of universal jurisdiction to foreign nationals who are civil servants or members of the armed forces
7. The double criminality rule (which requires a conduct constitutes an offense under both the extraditing and prosecuting state’s law)
8. Political control over decisions to investigate, prosecute or extradite
The study concludes:
Universal jurisdiction is an essential tool of international justice because of the limited jurisdiction of international courts and because national political and prosecutors are all too often unwilling an unable to genuinely investigate crimes under international law … in their own countries.
The surveys of particular countries will be invaluable to researchers and advocates. Well worth the read!


Ex-head of state in the ICC dock

The International Criminal Court's situation in Côte d'Ivoire jumped to the forefront with this news, posted this morning on the ICC website:

Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, national of Côte d’Ivoire, 66 years, arrived today at the International Criminal Court (ICC) detention centre in the Netherlands. He was surrendered to the ICC on 29 November 2011 by the national authorities of Côte d´Ivoire following a warrant of arrest issued under seal by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber III on 23 November 2011. The suspect’s initial appearance hearing before the Pre-Trial Chamber III, composed of Judges Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (presiding judge), Elizabeth Odio Benito and Adrian Fulford, will be held promptly.

Gbagbo (above right), Côte d'Ivoire's head of state in the last decade, had refused to cede after losing a bid to be re-elected President in autumn 2010. (credit for 2008 photo) Violence ensued, as we've posted. The winner of the election, Alassane Ouattara, finally took office this past April.
As for Gbagbo, he now stands charged, pursuant to Articles 7 and 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, as an indirect co-perpetrator of 4 counts of crimes against humanity against the civilian population in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire's largest city, and elsewhere.
Gbagbo will be the 1st former head of state or government actually to appear before a chamber of the ICC -- though not, of course, the 1st, or 2d, be charged; those titles go to Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir, still at large, and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, killed in Libya nearly 6 weeks ago.


Guest Blogger: Yvonne Dutton

It's IntLawGrrls' great pleasure to welcome Dr. Yvonne Dutton (left) as today's guest blogger.
Yvonne is on the faculty at the University of San Diego School of Law, where she currently teaches legal writing.
This past August, she received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Her dissertation examined state commitment to the International Criminal Court. Key features studied: how the ICC’s enforcement mechanisms influence state membership; and the ability of the ICC to realize goals of ending impunity for perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
In addition to the ICC and international human rights law more generally, Yvonne’s research interests include international cooperation (or the lack thereof) as it relates to the problem of maritime piracy. She discusses her most recent paper on piracy in her guest post below.
Yvonne received her J.D. from Columbia Law School, where she was a Stone Scholar and served on the Columbia Law Review. She thereafter practiced as a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, where she tried narcotics trafficking and organized crime cases.
Heartfelt welcome!


National anti-piracy laws needed

(Many thanks to IntLawGrrls for the generous invitation to contribute this guest post)

The number of maritime piracy attacks is spiraling ever-upward, pirates are increasingly using violence to carry out their attacks, and pirates are demanding more and more money for the safe release of their captives. Between 2006 and 2010, the number of yearly pirate attacks reported to the International Maritime Bureau, a 20-year-old, London-based division of the International Chamber of Commerce, almost doubled. (chart credit)
Not only did pirates attack ships, but in 2010, pirates took hostage an unprecedented 1181 seafarers—eight of whom pirates murdered. Moreover, maritime pirates are getting paid huge sums for their violent activities: average ransoms are estimated at between US$2 million and US$3 million.
This is a discouraging trend, especially because over the last several years, the international community has spent billions of dollars to support naval fleets that patrol pirate-infested waters with the goal of repressing piracy. While these naval fleets have thwarted some attacks and captured some pirates, the evidence about the increasing frequency of maritime piracy attacks suggests that the full deterrent effect of these naval resources is not being realized.
Instead, a culture of impunity reigns.
Consider this statistic from the report by Jack Lang, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which was delivered in January to the U.N. Security Council: About 90% of captured pirates are being released rather than prosecuted.
One reason cited for this culture of impunity, which I examine in my article “Maritime Piracy And The Impunity Gap: Insufficient Nationals Laws Or A Lack Of Political Will?”, forthcoming in Tulane Law Review, is the purported absence of domestic legislation to facilitate piracy prosecutions.
But, why would states lack domestic anti-piracy legislation?
After all, universal jurisdiction over piracy has existed for more than 100 years, meaning that states can prosecute pirates who attack on the high seas even where the attack does not involve the state’s citizens as either perpetrators or victims. In addition, most states are parties to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which codifies piracy’s status as a universal jurisdiction crime and which encourages states to cooperate in the repression of piracy to the fullest extent possible.
Yet, the anecdotal evidence suggests that states have not enacted piracy laws consistent with this international legal framework. In fact, since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1918 (April 27, 2010), and through to Resolution 2015 (October 24, 2011), the Council and other international actors have called on states to rectify the present culture of impunity by criminalizing piracy under their national laws and by considering favorably the prosecution of piracy suspects.
In an effort to determine what might be lacking in state anti-piracy laws and to contribute to the discussion of how to end the culture of impunity that surrounds piracy, in the forthcoming article, my article analyzes the nature of domestic anti-piracy laws in states for which I was able to obtain information in English. The chart below shows the states included in the sample and organizes them by type of piracy laws (or lack thereof):


Overall, my analysis supports a conclusion consistent with the Security Council’s observation that states generally lack domestic piracy laws consistent with customary international law and UNCLOS.
► For example, even where they have enacted a specific anti-piracy law—and are not relying only on general categories of crime such as robbery, assault, or murder—many states still tend to require some nexus between the state and the crime in order to exercise jurisdiction.
In fact, as the chart above shows, at most fifteen of the states surveyed specifically define piracy using UNCLOS or some other formulation, and also provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
► In addition, the analysis shows that even some of the universal jurisdiction anti-piracy laws may not be sufficient to successfully prosecute pirates.
Rather than tracking UNCLOS’s language, some laws provide broadly for universal jurisdiction “as defined by the law of nations.” Because that definition does not outline the elements of a piracy offense, however, some courts may conclude that certain acts—such as attempted, but not completed, attacks on ships—are not covered and cannot be punished. Indeed, as IntLawGrrls then posted, this was the conclusion of the U.S. District Court in United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 566 (E.D. Va. 2010).
The state laws that rely on the direct incorporation of treaty provisions have similar deficiencies. The very absence of domestic legislation defining the precise contours of the crime and its penalties renders it possible for alleged pirates to argue that they should not be punished, because they have not been provided with advance notice of exactly what conduct is proscribed.
It is true that piracy cases may result in claims for asylum, can be costly, require the state to expend prosecutorial and judicial resources that could otherwise be deployed to handle domestic crimes, and can involve significant evidentiary difficulties. But, I argue that states should not be able to so easily shirk their duties under UNCLOS to cooperate to the fullest extent to repress piracy.
Piracy is a universal problem that harms the international community as a whole. (credit for UN photo) If the world community wants to halt the increasing threat posed by maritime piracy, then all states must embrace their duty to share in the burden of prosecuting pirates, which means that all states must first pass the necessary domestic laws authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy offenses.


On November 30

On this day in ...
... 1973, in New York, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid was opened for signature. Its 1st article proclaimed

that apartheid is a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination ... are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat to international peace and security.

Further "declare[d] criminal" were "those organizations, institutions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid." (credit for image of official emblem for the United Nations' Anti-Apartheid Year, 1978) The convention entered into force on July 18, 1976, and today has 107 states parties. Notable nonparty states include South Africa -- whose policies at the time of adoption were targeted by the treaty -- as well as 3 of the Security Council's 5 permanent members -- France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

(Prior November 30 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

And now there are 2

The contest for the next Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is down to 2.
According to an ICC Assembly of States Parties statement released this morning:

After informal consultations among States Parties, it was decided to narrow the list to two candidates: Ms. Fatou Bensouda (Gambia) and Mr. Mohamed Chande Othman (United Republic of Tanzania). At the 1 December informal consultations, to be held in New York, States Parties will see if there is consensus on one candidate.

Have never met Chief Justice Othman (above right), who, like Bensouda (above left) (credit), hails from Africa (a circumstance explored here.) But we 'Grrls have frequently posted about Bensouda. Yours truly has been honored to have hosted her visit to my former institution, California-Davis, to have participated in Chautaqua Dialogs with her, and to have engaged in a public Q&A with her at annual meeting of the American Society of International Law this past spring. Bensouda's intelligence, acumen, passion, and wit are evident. And her understanding of the panoply of challenges facing the ICC in the next decade is unrivaled.
If consensus continues to prove elusive even after this latest trimming of what was a short list of 4, the election context could play out openly on December 12.
That's the date set for election of the Prosecutor, part of the Assembly's 9-day session at U.N. Headquarters in New York. The draft program for that session is here; preparatory documents available here.
Also on the agenda: the election of 6 new ICC judges; debate on budget, ICC headquarters (source of some controversy, as this article indicates), and other matters; and side events, among them the December 13 launch of the Gender Report Card on the International Criminal Court 2011, by Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, an organization some of whose leaders are IntLawGrrls guest alumnae, as well a December 20 session on "Challenges for the Next Prosecutor," hosted by Human Rights Watch.


5K


Thanks and congratulations to Hari M. Osofsky, whose excellent account below, on climate and energy, equals IntLawGrrls' 5,000th post since our founding 4-plus years ago!


The Urgency of Now--Why We Need to Stop Fighting about Climate Change and Get Serious about Energy Transition

The United Nations Framework Convention Convention on Climate Change has begun its annual conference of the parties in Durban.
From the start, the news is depressing, and as Lesley McAlister noted in her blog, has a bit of a deja vu quality, and not in a good way. The Chief Economist of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, indicated that we're on track for 6 degrees of warming by 2100 if we don't change our energy use patterns. Meanwhile, Canada, which is failing to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments, has announced it won't sign on for another commitment period. While there are many nuanced negotations going on regarding many important issues, which small groups of people fully understand, the progress on some of these topics since last year's Cancun negotations does not address the fundamental problem: we are nowhere any kind of big picture solution to this problem. This is why the soon-to-be-released casebook I'm writing with San Diego Law Professor Lesley K. McAllister ends with major climate change and geoengineering as it's two primary scenarios, and asks our students to try to get us to an alternative future.
I started a talk a week ago saying that I wish I were a climate skeptic and having a good friend say that she doesn't understand how we can keep going working on this incredibly depressing issue. It's hard to know what to do when consensus science says that we're creating a catastrophic problem and when there's just not political will to act fast enough. The reason I have projects on both suburbs and geoengineering emerges from the schizophrenia that this moment brings. I'm trying to come up with creative ways to impact the big picture as top down approaches fail (known by academics as pluralist or polycentric governance models) while trying to make sure we have legal mechanisms thought through as we begin to approach geoengineering more seriously. And for the record, I have very grave doubts that, even with our best scientists thinking it through, geoengineering (technological efforts to reverse warming effects or get carbon out of the system) is likely to go well. And all this is under the Obama Administration--many leading Republican candidates want to eliminate the meager progress this country has made and one of them may win if our economy doesn't improve more soon.
So, assuming there are plenty of people out there who are not radical climate skeptics but simply feel overwhelmed by this issue, what can you personally do to be constructive as people from around the world try to be constructive in Durban?
► First, we need to push as fast as we can in our local communities--and many of us live in small cities where we can make a difference (the central cities in the Twin Cities, for example, represent just a quarter of the metro's population)--to get our governments and people to start at least making the easy choices. There's still lots of low hanging fruit. By transitioning to cleaner energy through energy efficiency measures and increasing renewables, cities can often save themselves a lot of money. And green energy is not necessarily more expensive, by the way. One of the most hopeful moments for me this semester was when my students and I went to visit the regional transmission organization here and heard a system operator say that they try to put as much wind onto the system as possible, not because its environmentally better, but because it's the cheapest source of energy in the system.
► Second, we need to try to change the discourse and we can all make a difference in this. It's time to stop wasting enormous amounts of energy fighting, and work together. As is not uncommon in times of great economic distress, we have two populist movements in this country, the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street. Although very different politically, they both represent deep dissatisfaction with the status quo in this country. Meanwhile, we have an often vitriolic political discourse, especially as we march towards another presidential election, that leads to people wasting enormous time and energy fighting rather than working together constructively. We can each individually change this by reaching across the aisle and partnering. Energy transition, which really needs to happen, is not a Democratic or a Republican issue. Many of the suburban sustainability efforts in the Twin Cities metro that I've looked at are taking place in communities that lean Republican. Whatever you think of climate change, helping your community transition to cheaper, cleaner energy makes sense. These measures are not enough as our representatives sit in Durban likely failing to address climate change adequately, but they're something we can do right now, where we live, and make a difference.


(Cross-posted on Environmental Law Prof Blog and SALTLaw Blog).


Syrian state responsibility

An assessment of state responsibility preceded that of individual criminal responsibility in the expert report on Syria released yesterday.
Released was the 39-page report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, a body appointed in September by the U.N. Human Rights Council and comprising a Chairperson, Dr. Paulo Pinheiro, a Brazilian law professor emeritus and veteran of many U.N. inquiry posts, along with 2 members, Dr. Yakin Ertürk (left) (photo credit), who's a sociology professor in Turkey and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, and Karen Koning AbuZayd (right) (photo credit), who's long been active in U.N. human rights endeavors.
To begin its discussion of responsibility for the many atrocities enumerated, the report states at paragraph 109:

The Syrian Arab Republic has failed its obligations under international human rights law. Every internationally wrongful act of a State incurs the international responsibility of that State. Similarly, customary international law provides that a State is responsible for all acts committed by members of its military and security forces. The State is therefore responsible for wrongful acts, including crimes against humanity, committed by members of its military and security forces as documented in the present report.

Only then does it turn to the question of individual criminal responsibility -- a question it leaves for the most part unanswered, noting that Syria is not a party to the International Criminal Court and that its national laws likely would immunize from prosecution persons most responsible.
The order of responsibility set forth seems significant, and not just because this report -- unlike an analogous 2005 report on Darfur -- falls short of recommending U.N. Security Council referral to the ICC of the situation in Syria. The closest it came was to recommend that the U.N. Human Rights Council "[t]ake urgent steps, including through the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the Security Council, to implement the recommendations made in the present report." (The report also prompted others to renew calls for a Security Council referral; in an earlier post, I voiced concerns about the possibility.)
The decision to discuss state responsibility also stands as a reaffirmation that states bear primary responsibility to protect their own civilians from harm. That has not always been a given, as our colleague William Burke-White explains in part I of a new survey chapter, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect. General acceptance of a state's primary responsibility is an essential prerequisite of the second aspect of the responsibility to protect doctrine; that is, that a state's failure to shoulder its responsibility gives rise to the responsibility of the international community to act.
Entrenching the concept of primary responsibility in international documents promotes a culture of collective responsibility and embeds prevention as a normative goal. It is a notable feature not only of this report, but also of Article 1 of the Proposed International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity that IntLawGrrl Leila Nadya Sadat spearheaded and to which others of us contributed. One day, perhaps, such entrenchment will give rise before-the-fact actions that eliminate the need for after-the-fact intervention and adjudication.

The inquiry commission did conclude its report with a host of recommendations directed at various actors related to Syria. (map credit) All recommendations appear in the full report, beginning at paragraph 112. Paraphrased and excerpted, recommendations include:

To the Syrian government
► End gross human rights violations.
► Initiate investigations under domestic and international law, and while investigation is pending suspend security personnel alleged to have violated human rights.
Ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC and enact national implementing legislation.
► End arbitrary detention and allow international monitoring of detention centers, as well as overall in-country access for human rights monitors, aid agencies, and journalists.
► Replace immunity laws with laws governing security forces according to international standards.
► Establish a mechanism for investigation of disappearances, as well as a reparations fund for victims of a range of human rights violations.
► Facilitate voluntary return of refugees.

To Syrian opposition groups
► Ensure respect for and act according to international human rights law.

To the U.N. Human Rights Council
► In addition to the "urgent steps" recommendation quoted above, establish a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Syria.

To the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
► Establish in Syria an in-the-field protection and promotion mandate.

To U.N. members, particularly those in the Arab League
► Aid various measures recommended above, "and suspend the provision of arms and other military material to all parties".
► Aid Syria to address weaknesses in its judicial and security sectors.
► Give refuge to Syrian asylum seekers -- a recommendation that resonates with Jaya Ramji-Nogales' excellent post yesterday.


On November 29

On this day in ...
... 1979, the United States sued Iran in the International Court of Justice (logo at left). The U.S. application that instituted ICJ proceedings alleged that Iran had breached its obligations under an array of treaties -- among them the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and on Consular Relations -- by its failure either to secure the release of hostages being held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran or to punish the persons responsible for the November 4, 1979, embassy takeover. (prior post) The case remained on the docket until May 1981; it was removed a year after the Hague-based Court's ruling in favor of the United States (prior post) prompted a settlement agreement between the states.

(Prior November 29 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Monday, November 28, 2011

After the Arab Spring

While many Egyptians today fear violence at the polls, the non-Egyptians in their midst worry that the elections will bring increased xenophobia and widespread abuse of migrants. As we've blogged before, though the Arab spring promises liberation for many native North Africans, the migrant workers in their midst have faced deteriorating security and significant rights violations. And those North Africans who've attempted to flee to Europe to escape instability have been met with unwelcoming conditions, to say the least.
How should international migration law and policy move forward from here? This month, Dr. Khalid Koser published a report entitled Responding to Migration from Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Libya that assesses international responses to the migration dimensions of the Libyan crisis, finding serious shortfalls in strategic planning and drawing out lessons for future complex migration crises.
The study notes that over 1 million people from Libya and Tunisia, including nationals, migrant workers, refugees and asylum-seekers, have been displaced internally and internationally. This massive migration has challenged basic services delivery, such as health, food, and shelter, and increased the vulnerability of migrants. Though the crisis in Libya is headed to resolution, Dr. Koser reminds us that this type of complex migration is likely to recur in the future due to environmental change and military intervention among other factors. The particular challenge inherent in these situations is that different categories of migrants move together so it is difficult to distinguish those entitled to special protection.
In the case of Libya, there were about 10,000 asylum seekers and refugees registered by UNHCR at the beginning of the crisis. By June 2011, 500,000 migrant workers had left Libya, largely for Tunisia and Egypt. About half of these migrants were third country nationals, 60,000 of whom were flown home (35,000 to China). As for Libyans themselves, though many have now returned, nearly 175,000 sought refugee in Egypt and nearly 325,000 fled to Tunisia. A far smaller number tried to enter Europe (43,000 from North Africa in total). About 150,000 people have been displaced within Libya.
How have countries and international organizations responded to the crisis? These internally displaced fared the worst, as humanitarian organizations were unable to penetrate Libya's borders. These IDPs will have significant needs once the country stabilizes, including access to their property, personal documentation, family reunification, and reconciliation with those who were not displaced.
For those able to escape, Egypt and Tunisia deserve kudos for keeping their borders open despite the significant pressure on public services resulting from the influx. The United Kingdom and the ICRC provided significant international assistance to those who crossed into Egypt and Tunisia, including enabling migrant workers to return to their home countries. This portion of the crisis response, in particular involving significant cooperation between UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration, was perhaps the most successful. However, it was still difficult for many countries to address the return of migrant workers, given their poor economic circumstances and dependence on remittances from these workers.
Ironically, the most vociferously negative response has come from Europe, which received the smallest number of migrants. Most of those who made it to Lampedusa have now been transferred to Italy for processing, though this has not been without political ramifications (further described here). In the meantime, FRONTEX has stepped up maritime operations and the EU has offered financial assistance and training to the coastguard in Tunisia. France and Italy are undertaking joint patrols by sea.
Dr. Koser draws out several important policy questions from these responses. How can the international community better protect internally displaced persons? Faced with only a set of non-binding principles that draw from existing international law, international organizations have faced serious obstacles in their efforts to offer aid to IDPs. Are migrant workers to be considered internally displaced persons? The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement do not offer a clear response to this question, potentially leaving such migrants without even the limited protections accorded IDPs. Do we need a new UN agency to protect non-refugee migrants in need of protection and assistance? Though existing agencies worked together in response to the Libyan crisis, it's still unclear who deserves what level of international protection, and more importantly whether the current hierarchy of protection is appropriate for modern humanitarian crises.

(photo credit)

On November 28

On this day in ...
... 1853, a daughter, Helen Magill, was born in Providence, Rhode Island, into a Quaker family. Her father's professorial posts proved her entree into formal studies: as a child she was the only girl student at Boston Public Latin School. She was among the 5 women and 1 man who made up the 1st graduating class at Swarthmore College, where her father was president. In 1877, she became the 1st American woman to earn a Ph.D. -- in Greek, from Boston University. Following further studies in England, she returned to the United State and became a teacher. Three years after meeting a retired-Cornell-president-turned-diplomat (and onetime classmate of her father) while presenting a paper at American Social Science Association, she married him in 1890. Diplomatic service would find the couple living in St. Petersburg, Russia and Berlin, Germany, before his death in 1918 -- 5 years after she made a stir by voicing opposition to women's suffrage. Helen Magill White (above right) died in Maine in 1944. (credit for 1873 photo)

(Prior November 28 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Sunday, November 27, 2011

Cluster outlier

Its effort to place itself nearer to a 3-year-old weapons control movement having failed, the United States remains an outlier among countries working to eliminate cluster bombs.
Since 2008 the motive force for banning these bombs -- known to present a tragic risk of misuse by children -- has been the Convention on Cluster Munitions. As we've posted, that international treaty was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Dublin in June 2008. It opened for signature the following December in Oslo, Noway (thus it's sometimes called the Oslo Convention), and it entered into force in August 2010. Today it has 66 states parties, including not only
► Countries that have suffered conflict, among them Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, but also
► U.S. neighbors like Canada and Mexico,
► NATO members (in addition to Canada) like Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as
► Japan and Australia, key Pacific allies of the United States.
An additional 45 states have signed but not ratified.
The United States opposed the Cluster Munitions Convention from the get-go. Back in 2008, some in America contended that countries given to military intervention would not join. The states parties list above reveals that a number of countries do not view intervention and a cluster-bomb ban as mutually exclusive.
Still, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh told reporters earlier this month:

[M]any countries in the world are not parties to Oslo and are unlikely to become so, and that they represent 85 to 90 percent of the world’s cluster munition stockpiles. So a question then becomes: How do you regulate that 85 to 90 percent holders if they’re never going to join the Oslo Convention?

His answer? Urge adoption of a less comprehensive prohibition within the framework of a different weapons control regime. It's the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects as amended on 21 December 2001, known for short as the Convention on Conventional Weapons, of which the United States is a member. Koh advocated a draft protocol that would have banned cluster munitions made before, but not after, 1980. (credit for photo at left of Vietnam War-era U.S. cluster bomblet) (The August version of the proposal and an alternative draft plan are available here.) Koh stated at his November 16 press conference:

We see the two as complementary, not as competitive. Nothing that we are saying or supporting would diminish or detract from the Oslo Convention ...

The U.S. official who'd joined Koh at the press conference, Assistant Secretary of Defense Bill Lietzau, agreed.
But a portion of the rest of the world did not see it that way.
The International Committee of the Red Cross had spoken against the protocol the day before the Koh-Lietzau press conference. And this past Friday, concluding the Conventional Weapons Convention 4th Review Conference in Geneva, diplomats rejected the draft protocol even though the instrument had won support from cluster-munitions producers China, India, and Russia, as well as the United States.
A Human Rights Watch representative saw in the result proof of a "powerful alliance driving the Oslo partnership."
Also to be seen is a familiar dynamic: the United States would place itself on the side of disarmament and accountability, yet will not embrace multilaterally approved means toward those ends.
Stating it was "deeply disappointed," the U.S. Mission in Geneva said:

In the wake of this outcome, the United States will continue to implement its own voluntary policy to prohibit by 2018 the use of cluster munitions with more than a one percent unexploded ordnance rate, and we encourage other countries to take similar steps. The United States will also continue to serve as a world leader in addressing the humanitarian impact of cluster munition and other explosive remnants.

In short, on this as on other issues, the United States will go it alone.



On November 27

On this day in ...
... 1991 (20 years ago today), U.N. Security Council Resolution 721 was adopted. It acknowledged that participants on all sides of the disputes in Yugoslavia had requested U.N. peacekeepers. The resolution of the Council (above left) indicated that a peacekeeping mission could be initiated, but only if all parties complied with a 4-day-old unconditional ceasefire agreement. (photo credit)

(Prior November 27 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Saturday, November 26, 2011

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

[A] death warrant was signed for another death row inmate, Gary Haugen. And again he has volunteered to die.
He is just one of 37 inmates on death row today. Some have been there for over 20 years. They all have many years and appeals left before there is even a remote possibility of carrying out their death sentence. Two others have died of natural causes after more than a decade on death row. The reality is that Oregon’s death row is an extremely expensive life prison term, likely several times more expensive that the life terms of others who happen to have been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole -- rather than the death penalty.
And while it may be convenient to blame lengthy and expensive death penalty trials and appeals on inmates 'working the system,' the truth is courts (and society) continue to reinterpret when, how and under what circumstances it is acceptable for the state to kill someone. Over time, those options are narrowing. Courts are applying stricter standards and continually raising the bar for prosecuting death penalty cases. Consider that it was only six years ago that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself and held that it is unconstitutional to impose capital punishment on those under the age of 18. For a state intent on maintaining a death penalty, the inevitable result will be bigger questions, fewer options and higher costs.
It is time for Oregon to consider a different approach. I refuse to be a part of this compromised and inequitable system any longer; and I will not allow further executions while I am Governor.


-- Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber, announcing his decision to impose a moratorium on executions in his state during his tenure. (Video here.) (image credit) The full statement that Kitzhaber delivered on Tuesday, who had let 2 executions go forward in a previous term as governor, places his decision in the context both of Oregon history and of the recent abolitions of capital punishment in the states of Illinois, New Jersey, and New Mexico.


Go On! ICL experts debate

(Go On! is an occasional item on symposia and other events of interest)

What promises to be a lively discussion of "International Justice: Between Impunity and Show Trials" will take place at 6:30 p.m. February 3, 2012, at the Brunei Gallery Lecture Theatre at SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London, England.
Why lively?
Scheduled to speak are:
Martti Koskenniemi (left), Academy Professor of International Law, University of Helsinki, Finland (photo credit), whose scholarship includes From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (2006); and
Jacques Vergès (right), a defense attorney who, as we've frequently posted, is noted for his representation of persons accused of international crimes. (photo credit)
Organizers write:

When former [Serbian] President [Slobodan] Milosevic began his defence at The Hague, now 10 years ago, there was no reason to be surprised by his chosen tactics. By turning the accusing finger towards the West, in particular the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for their alleged complicity in first destroying what Milosevic called "mini-Yugoslavia" (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and in 1999 waging a war of aggression against his own country, he aimed to avoid conducting his defence under conditions laid down by his adversaries. At the same time, his manoeuvre highlights, like so many other cases, the difficulty of grappling with large political crises by means of individual criminal responsibility and gives reason to question the ability of criminal trial to express or conserve the 'truth' of a complex series of events involving the often erratic action by major international players, Great Powers, the European Union, the United Nations, and so on.
This panel discussion will explore -- on the eve of the decennial anniversary of the Milosevic case -- whether international justice oscillates ambivalently between the wish to punish those individually responsible for international crimes and the danger of staging show trials in that process.

Attendees must preregister; online registration and further details are here.


On November 26

On this day in ...
... 1942, just shy of a year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drew the United States into World War II combat, the Casablanca premiered in New York City. (movie poster credit) As had President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's January 1941 articulation of the "4 Freedoms," Casablanca, a story of love unrequited in a time when Nazis controlled Vichy North Africa, told Americans why the war was being fought: for freedom and against totalitarianism. The film went on to win Best Picture and 2 other Academy Awards, to contribute a host of "now-iconic quotes," and to become a timeless symbol of what sometimes is called America's "greatest generation."

(Prior November 26 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Friday, November 25, 2011

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

'Face au développement massif de robots capables de déployer une force létale, il faut une prohibition.'

that is,

'In the face of massive development of robots able to use lethal force, there must be regulation.'


-- Captain Mark Hagerott, professor of the history of science and technology at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. (photo credit) He was quoted in "Avec les robots guerriers, la guerre va changer de visage," an excellent Le Monde article offering an array of opinions about this the emergence of robotic military personnel. (It follows an equally provocative article on autonomous robotic warfare by Peter Finn, published by the Washington Post in September.) Le Monde writer Nathalie Guibert talked with Hagerott and others in the context of a symposium on the subject earlier this month at Ecoles de Saint-Cyr, the French military academy located in Coëtquidan in Guer, in the Morbihan department of the province of Brittany. Among many other military experts quoted was French Brigadier General Michael Yakovleff, a Saint-Cyr graduate now serving at NATO. Yakovleff asked a question emblematic of the tactical and ethical issues presented:

'Si on attaque mon robot, vais-je tirer dans la foule pour le défendre ?'

that is,

'If my robot is attacked, am I to fire into the crowd to defend it?'


On November 25

On this day in ...
... 1911 (100 years ago today), Mexican revolutionary leader Emiliano Zapata announced the Plan de Ayala, "which stated that the goal of the revolution was for land to be redistributed among the poor." He and his supporter then fought against a government that had come into power as a result of a joint rebellion earlier in the year. Zapata (right) would continue to fight until his assassination on April 10, 1919. (photo credit)

(Prior November 25 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Thursday, November 24, 2011

Thanks for the vote

Today we American 'Grrls settle into a day of Thanksgiving.
In years past, things were much less settled. Newspaper archives reveal that Thanksgiving once offered a platform for debate about whether American women ought to be allowed to vote.
In 1909, women in Chicago postponed dinner to attend a Thankgiving Day arrival of Emmeline Pankhurst, the famed British suffragist and IntLawGrrls foremother.
That same year, The New York Times reported, one Madison Avenue minister deployed his Thanksgiving-Day pulpit

to attack the campaign for women’s right to vote, by attempting to denigrate some of those who support it.

The charge levied against leaders who'd recently taken part in a Woman’s Suffrage Convention at Carnegie Hall? Daring to divorce. The minister told his congregation:

'I do know that there was one woman very conspicuously present upon that platform who had herself changed husbands, so I suppose that there must have been something in her case that might give point to her abjurations; yes, and there was another one there, too, prominently connected with the movement — I mean the eruption — that also belonged to the migratory sisterhood.'

The minister professed not to be painting all suffragists with the same broad, tainted brush:

'I do not mean at all that this agitation is in the interests of what might be called ‘tandem polygamy,’ but our ladies, of the delicacy with which they are supposed to be possessed, and with which, as a rule, they certainly are possessed, should be made thoughtful of facts of this kind.'

A very different note was sounded when the Woman Suffrage Party met in the same month 4 years later at Carnegie Hall. The partied rallied in "thanksgiving for the suffrage victories won in the States in this country and abroad in the last year" -- and raised $7,000 for the cause. The Times reported that "Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt [left], President of the International Suffrage Alliance," (photo credit) defended suffragists' militancy with these words:

'I do not believe in war, but I say to you, fellow-citizens,that if the women are going on making their demand and election after election the voters are going against them at the polls, I tell you we will not endure it.'

As posted, by Thanksgiving Day 1920, women had won the franchise.


On November 24

On this day in ...
... 1961 (50 years ago today), U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI) urged maintenance on the African continent of a nuclear-free zone. Specifically, it called upon U.N. member states to "refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form," or "from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons"; and to "consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone." (image credit)

(Prior November 24 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Wednesday, November 23, 2011

...further from ICC...

As if in response to questions like those raised in Naomi Roht-Arriaza's excellent post below, the International Criminal Court Public Affairs Unit just posted the following statement on the ICC website (emphasis added):

Should the Libyan authorities wish to conduct national prosecutions against the suspect, they shall submit a challenge to the admissibility of the case before Pre-Trial Chamber I, pursuant to articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Any decision on the admissibility of a case is under the sole competence of the Judges of the ICC.
Therefore, contrary to what has been reported in the media, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC remains seized of the case and the Libyan obligation to fully cooperate with the Court remains in force.

(Our colleague, Leiden Professor Carsten Stahns, details the relation between the ICC Statute and the Libya situation here.) Click on this title for the full ICC press release, "Course of action before the ICC following the arrest of the suspect Saif Al Islam Gaddafi in Libya."


Prospects for justice in Libya

So International Criminal Court Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo has ducked an ugly confrontation with the Libyan government about where to try Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and former intelligence chief Abdullah Al-Senussi.
Rather than insist that the Libyan judicial system is in no shape to take on a complex prosecution, Moreno Ocampo has conceded that Libya can try the case – with ICC help. (Prior IntLawGrrls posts on this issue available here.)
Still not clear:
► On the one hand, whether that means that the ICC would sit in Tripoli, as Article 3(3) of its Rome Statute allows (map credit); or
► On the other hand, whether that means that the proceedings would be national, with foreign technical assistance (something the ICC in the past has said it is not set up to provide). (And see above update post.)
Plus, if the first path were pursued, it would still be up to the ICC judges to decide what should happen if Libya brought a challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction on grounds that Libya is not unable nor unwilling to prosecute the two men. Maybe that's what Moreno Ocampo meant yesterday when he told reporters in Tripoli that "our judges have to be involved." But it sounds a bit strange to me to have the Prosecutor pre-commit on a judicial decision.
Assuming the Libyans choose the second path, and move to try the two (along with others) under Libyan law, there are a number of as-yet unsolved problems.
It’s not clear whether Libyan law includes a provision on crimes against humanity, and my guess would be it’s unlikely. Will the ICC accept a prosecution for murder or torture instead of crimes against humanity? Seems problematic. The Libyans can of course pass a new law, but then there’s a principle of legality/ex post facto problem with trying people for crimes that weren’t in the penal code when committed. They could do as the Latin Americans have done, and find that customary international law criminalized these acts long ago, so there’s no problem with the principle of legality. But that leaves them having to import penalties, theories of liability and probably some other issues from some other part of domestic or international law.
All of which is to say, Moreno Ocampo (right) may have avoided one sticky wicket, only to plunge the Libyans into another one. Not to mention all the problems of lack of capacity, lack of evidence gathering abilities, concerns about due process, and the like.
Meanwhile, Libya has produced a draft transitional justice law.
While it’s not clear whether this will be the final shape of things, the draft creates a committee appointed by the Transitional National Council to deal with investigations and reconciliation dating from September 1969 until the present. The committee would be organized with an executive board of directors in charge of committees on investigation, reconciliation, and reparations. All the members will be Libyans, chosen for their personal characteristics. Only exclusion: no former Revolutionary Movement or Guard members.
The Committee will have the power to subpoena evidence and witnesses; non-cooperation can lead to a fine and up to 6 months in jail. The Committee will investigate, and pass the results of its investigation on to the courts with a recommendation for prosecution. Its mandate would cover organized and unorganized violence on any side, before or after liberation. It would thus cover not just Gaddafi-era crimes but those committed by anti-Qaddafi militias, including the execution of Gaddafi himself.
How a consideration of individual cases will lead to an analysis of the overall patterns and causes of violations is not clear in the draft.
It calls for (mostly) public hearings, but not necessarily a public report. There are also reparations provisions, a call for expropriation of ill-gotten wealth from the Gaddafi family and associates, and provisions on re-nationalizing those who Gaddafi stripped of their citizenship.
Lots of good things in the draft, but also a lot of dependence on a legal system that, at least we’re being told here in the United States, is in bad shape. Is it that we don’t understand the system well enough? Or that the Libyans overestimate its abilities and underestimate the difficulties? Or both?


Guest Blogger: Anna Dolidze

It's IntLawGrrls' great pleasure to welcome Anna Dolidze (left) as today's guest blogger.
Anna is a candidate for the J.S.D. degree at Cornell Law School, where she is also a Fellow at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and a Telluride House Resident Fellow. Her dissertation focuses on the roles that 3d-party interventions by human rights organizations play in international tribunals. Anna’s wider research interests include: the roles of nonstate actors in the making of international human rights norms; and the rights, including the right to property restitution, of migrants. (Our prior post about Anna pointed to her July 2011 ASIL Insight on international intervention in Libya.) Her guest post below addresses the rights of stateless people in light of the migration touched off by this year's unrest in North Africa and the Middle East.
A native of the Republic of Georgia, Anna graduated magna cum laude in 2002 from Tbilisi State University Law Department, where she was awarded the E. Shevarnadze Presidential scholarship for outstanding academic achievement. She is the former President of the Georgian Young Lawyers Association.
In 2004, having earned a full scholarship from the Dutch government, Anna received her LL.M. in Public International Law from the University of Leiden. She then clerked at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. She was an Albert Podell Global Scholar at Risk at New York University School of Law in 2008. In 2009, Atlantik-Brücke named her a Young European Leader, and in 2010, Rondine Cittadella della Pace recognized Anna for her efforts in promoting peace in the Caucasus.
Before coming to academia, Anna had worked at a number of international organizations, including the Russian Justice Initiative, Save the Children, and Human Rights Watch.
Anna joins another IntLawGrrls alumna, Larissa van den Herik, in dedicating her post to the philosopher about whom we've frequently posted, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). Arendt's influence is evident in Anna's guest post below.
Heartfelt welcome!


Statelessness & the right to have rights

(Thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute this guest post)

In 2011 the Italian Lampedusa Island has turned, to paraphrase the artist Francis Picabia, into a beautiful monster.
Spectacular views unfolding from the Island were marred with images of thousands of people crowded in immigration centers, and hundreds more dying on their way to find shelter there. (map credit)
Although the Island has long been a destination of migrants from North Africa, looking for safe haven and shelter in Europe, the influx reached its peak in 2011, as IntLawGrrl Jaya Ramji-Nogales has posted. The new wave of immigrants and the island’s inability to handle them renewed the European political debate on migration.
In my paper, Lampedusa and Beyond: Recognition, Implementation and Justiciability of the Stateless Persons’ Rights under International Law, I argue that this debate should be expanded to discuss the protection of stateless persons’ rights beyond the moments of crises.
A number of scholars have addressed the question.
► On the one end of the continuum is the20th century philosopher (and IntLawGrrls foremother) Hannah Arendt (below right). (image credit) Herself stateless for more than a decade, she argued that paradoxically, human rights can only be realized within the nation state. She wrote:

'The Rights of Man had been defined as 'inalienable' because they were supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.'

Many commentators, including Seyla Benhabib, Laura van Waasm, and Patrick Weil, have shared Arendt’s skepticism.
► On the other end of the continuum is Dr. Yasemin Soysal (below left), of the Department of Sociology, University of Essex, England. (photo credit) In her well-known book, The Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (1995), Soysal argued that elaboration and conclusion of international human rights treaties, including those that relate to non-citizens, influence the membership situation of those persons domestically, either by creating a separate legal category of migrants or by influencing domestic discourses and invocation of rights claims. Soysal argued:

'Individual rights and obligations, which were historically located in the nation-State, have increasingly moved to a universalistic place, transcending the boundaries of particular nation-States.'

My article contributes to this trajectory of debate in two ways.
First, the article puts forward a genealogy of state participation in the international legal recognition of statelessness and of the enforcement of the treaty regime on statelessness. This allows for novel conclusions as to what extent international law has been effectively implemented in protecting the rights of stateless persons.
Second, I enrich the aforementioned debate with the most recent specific analysis of the treatment of the stateless persons’ rights- claims by a major international human rights tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights. (credit for photo, below right, of court's headquarters in Strasbourg, France)
As a result, I advance a number of findings.

Overall framework
International law has evolved from considering that stateless persons have no rights, as it did in the 1930s.
Today, there is an elaborate international treaty regime on statelessness, which includes three types of treaties:
►1st, general treaties that cover the rights of stateless;
►2d, treaties that protect the rights of stateless among disadvantaged groups, such as women and children; and
►3d, treaties that protect specific rights of stateless persons, such as copyright.
Nevertheless, states are reluctant to accept international obligations in relation to stateless persons. This is evidenced by continuously low number of states participating in these treaties.
States are more likely to accept international obligations in relation to statelessness when those obligations are part of a regime of protecting disadvantaged populations, such as women and children.
Even in this instance, however, the implementation of these obligations is a problem. Provisions on the nationality of women and children are variously: subject to interpretation in accordance with the domestic legislation; hotly contested; or given by states a low priority for implementation.

European Convention framework
The system established by Europe's 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms maintains three separate rights regimes depending on the legal status of the rights-bearer:
► 1st, rights applicable to everyone, notwithstanding their immigration status;
► 2d, rights applicable only to citizens; and
► 3d, rights applicable to migrants.
Overview of the court’s case law in relation to the claims by stateless claimants evidences that some individual claimants have been able to defend their rights through the Convention machinery, including their rights to private and family life, right to freedom of movement, prohibition of torture and the right to a fair trial.
The jurisprudence of the Court has advanced in the direction of affording more protection to stateless persons’ rights in two areas; specifically: the threat or the fact of expulsion of stateless persons has acquired more seriousness and a bigger potential for being recognized as a violation of the Convention; and case law indicates emerging socio-economic obligations of host countries towards stateless individuals.
Nevertheless, despite this positive dynamic, there are three particular issues, which hinder effective protection of stateless persons’ rights.
► 1st, those stateless applicants who pass the admissibility threshold of the Court (up to 90% of applications are declared inadmissible) are confronted with the Court’s inconsistent approach to determining the principles applicable to the recognition of statelessness.
► 2d, in the third-party intervention, or amicus curiae, procedure, stateless persons have no possibility of being supported by the state’s intervention.
This is because states can only intervene in support of an application by their own nationals. As the third-party intervention procedure is an important mechanism to provide the Court with expertise and information, the lack of this possibility puts stateless persons at a disadvantage vis-à-vis citizens. Furthermore, it deprives the court of the ability to hear voices representative of the condition of statelessness.
► 3d, the larger structural problem should be kept in mind.
Applicants often have to wait for up to 14 years before the Court adjudicates their claims. Meanwhile, applicants often face deportation threats and undergo detention.
Costs for legal services for preparing an application vary, from the equivalent of US $25 to as much as $160 per hour.
How many of the stateless persons, who already have trouble realizing their rights due to lack of citizenship status, can afford to wait under duress for more than a decade for their application to be adjudicated, or pay for legal services without legal aid? Undoubtedly, such persons are a minority. Hence, the dozen or so cases in which stateless persons vindicated their rights through the Court are a tip of the iceberg of stateless persons’ grievances which might require redress.

Involving the UNHCR
Finally, my article puts forward a set of recommendations which can partially address the aforementioned problems.
Among others, I suggest amending the European Convention so that the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the agency experienced in advocating internationally for stateless persons, will be endowed with the right to intervene as a third party before the European Court of Human Rights when stateless persons’ claims are at stake.