Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts

Friday, October 12, 2012

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)
'Malala inspires us because she had the courage to defy the totalitarian mind-set others would have imposed on her. Her life represents a brighter future for Pakistan and the region. We must speak up before these acts occur, work to ensure that they do not happen again, and keep our courage to continue to resist the ongoing cruelty and barbarism of the Taliban. Malala Yousafzai refused to look the other way. We owe it to her courage and sacrifice to do the same.'
Former U.S. 1st Lady Laura Bush (left), in a Washington Post op-ed inspired by Malala Yousafzai (above right), a 14-year-old Pakistani girl who for the last 3 years has been blogging, in Urdu, about her efforts to learn notwithstanding opposition in her community to the education of girls. (photo credits here and here) The girl now is in hospital in critical condition, the victim of a masked gunman who on Tuesday boarded her school bus, confirmed her name, and shot her.

Monday, May 28, 2012

On May 28

On this day in ...
... 1998, declaring,
'We never wanted to participate in this nuclear race'
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced in a televised statement that Pakistan had conducted 5 underground nuclear tests in Baluchistan, a region of Pakistan near its border with Afghanistan. (image credit) Sharif contended that the tests were "inevitable" following news 2 weeks earlier that India had conducted 5 similar nuclear tests. To this day, India and Pakistan remain  nuclear states outside the regulation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and, also, tense neighbors.

(Prior May 28 posts are here, here, here, here, and here.)

Saturday, May 5, 2012

After 40 years, justice to victims of 1971 Bangladesh war

(Our thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute this introductory post)

More than forty years after Bangladesh’s 1971 bloody war of independence from Pakistan, the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh is working to end impunity for the crimes committed during the conflict. (map credit)
The human rights abuses and war crimes carried out by the Pakistani soldiers and Bangladeshi irregular forces included the targeted mass killing of Hindus, intellectuals, and widespread sexual violence against women. The International Crimes (Tribunal) Act of 1973 provided for the establishment of a tribunal to prosecute crimes committed during the war. However, a few years after the Act’s initial adoption, the political landscape changed and all accountability efforts were put off until 2008.
The trials began in October 2011. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend to former members of the Pakistani army, and therefore the Tribunal is not able to prosecute those individuals most responsible for the international crimes committed. All seven of the accused are Bangladeshis alleged to have assisted the Pakistani forces.
Prosecuting individuals under a forty-year-old war crimes domestic statute presents important questions about how these international crimes are defined in domestic law and what standards the court should apply. The Bangladeshi government has affirmed that the trials will be conducted in accordance with international legal standards. The former law minister pledged that the trials
“will not violate human rights…and due process of law will be truly observed”—including “laws from around the world.”
Yet officials also have emphasized that the International Crimes Tribunal is a domestic tribunal governed by Bangladeshi law.
So what happens when these two sets of laws are in conflict or tension?
As IntLawGrrl Kristine A. Huskey posted  last year here and here, the International Crimes Tribunal has received criticism, including letters from Human Rights Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and Stephen J. Rapp, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues. Critics contended that the Tribunal falls short of meeting international standards in some areas, and that it should strengthen its practices in others. These criticisms included concerns about:
► Due process protections for the accused;
► Extent to which the definitions of the crimes in the Act are consistent with customary international law;
► Availability of death penalty;
► Provisions for witness protection; and
► Pre-trial and trial procedures.
Thus, the Tribunal finds itself facing particular challenges prosecuting international crimes in a domestic court. These challenges include lack of national expertise in international law, debate over the relevance of international law in determining the definitions of offenses in the domestic statute, and evidentiary standards. Bangladesh, like the domestic tribunals in Iraq and Indonesia, has been widely criticized as politicized and failing to uphold fair trial standards. Yet in Bangladesh there is the perception that advocacy for international standards fails to take into account that the Tribunal has instituted due process procedures that are more generous than the accused would enjoy before the regular criminal courts. With these challenges, the spotlight is on Bangladesh to see if it can become an example that fair and legitimate prosecutions of international crimes are possible in a domestic tribunal.
As interns in the International Human Rights Law Clinic at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, we have worked to support the Liberation War Museum, a leading Bangladeshi civil society group.

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

On December 6

On this day in ...
... 1971 (40 years ago today), Pakistan severed diplomatic relations with India after the India government recognized the territory formerly known as East Pakistan as an independent nation-state. These development occurred amid an intense air war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan would surrender 10 days later, and that former territory, "Bangladesh -- meaning 'Bengal country' -- was born." (map credit)

(Prior December 6 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

On June 8

On this day in ...
... 1977, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), were signed in Geneva, Switzerland. Among the innovations were detailed provisions on treatment of persons in the power of a party to international conflict, in Protocol I, and the explicit extension of international humanitarian law protections to non-international conflicts, in Protocol II. (image credit) Today the treaties have 170 and 165 states parties, respectively. Countries that have signed but not ratified: as to Protocol I, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United States; as to Protocol II, all of those just listed with the exception of the Philippines.

(Prior June 8 posts are here, here, here, and here.)

Sunday, June 5, 2011

...and counting...

(Occasional sobering thoughts.) It has been 11 weeks since, as we then posted, the United States and other countries intervened militarily against the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Intervention continues, albeit now under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Having earlier this week extended its mission for another 3 months, NATO appears to have stepped up its attacks on Tripoli. And a permanent member that had abstained from voting on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 -- Russia -- now has joined a chorus calling for Qaddafi to go.
In Geneva tomorrow, discussion is scheduled of the report that the 3-member Libya inquiry commission (prior post) released last week and available here. The commission, appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council, found the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by government and rebel troops alike.
Casualty numbers in this conflict are hard to come by. Best estimate found is a month old: from 2,000 to 10,000 persons killed between March 2 and May 3. (credit for above right Associated Press photo, by Darko Bandic, of a woman who attended a "funeral for nine of 11 clerics allegedly killed in a NATO airstrike in Tripoli" on May 14)
► As for Afghanistan, conflict now is nearing its 10th anniversary. May was the deadliest month for servicemembers in Afghanistan this year. Meanwhile, civilian deaths continue to provoke complaint. Last Tuesday -- days after "a weekend airstrike in Helmand province that Afghan officials said killed 14 civilians, 11 of them children" -- Afghan President Hamid Karzai insisted

'that NATO refrain from airstrikes on residential compounds, marking a sharp escalation in his long-running feud with Western commanders over the issue of civilian casualties.'

Yesterday, Robert Gates, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, envisioned negotiations; that is, he said

there could be political talks with the Afghan Taliban by the end of this year if NATO made more military advances and put pressure on the insurgents.

(
credit for 2008 Associated Press photo above left, by Alauddin Khan, of funeral of victim of suicide bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan)

The U.S. Department of Defense reports that in Afghanistan, coalition military casualties stand at 1,605 Americans, 369 Britons, and 535 other coalition servicemembers. That's an increase of 100, 9, and 28 casualties, respectively, in the last 11 weeks. The total coalition casualty count in the Afghanistan conflict is 2,509 service women and men.
► Drone attacks continue on both sides of the AfPak line. Save for occasional announcements like that yesterday respecting the drone-attack killing of an al Qaeda leader in Pakistan, no casualty figures available respecting that side of the border.
► Iraq Body Count reports that between 101,121 and 110,454 Iraqi women, children, and men have died in the conflict in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. That represents an increase of between 1,070 and 1,136 persons in the last 11 weeks. According to the U.S. Defense Department, 4,454 American servicemembers have been killed in Iraq, representing 14 servicemember deaths in the last 11 weeks. (As posted, U.S. troops are the only foreign forces remaining in Iraq.)

Monday, May 2, 2011

Bin Laden dead

Toward the end of the second week of September 2001, my family and I walked past one of those floor-to-ceiling posters French news magazines use to advertise the week's cover. From beneath a white turban, heavy-browed eyes stared out of a gaunt face with long nose and beard.
Our son exclaimed:
'That is the bad man who killed all the people in New York.'

Our son was 3-1/2 and had just finished his second week at the Paris preschool he would attend all that sabbatical year. He did not yet understand his classmates' language, and we thought we had shielded him from the tragedy that had taken place on Tuesday of that week.
And yet our son knew the essence of what there was to know about Osama bin Laden.
Then 44, the Saudi-born bin Laden led the attacks of September 11, 2001 -- the hijackings of three airliners, which crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, and a field in Pennsylvania. Innocents killed on that day numbered nearly 2,700 Americans and almost 400 other persons, from Britain, India, South Korea, Canada, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, the Philippines, Australia, Germany, and Italy.
It's reported that over the years thousands more -- 85% of them Muslims -- have died at the hands of al Qaeda, the terrorist network built by bin Laden.
And now bin Laden is dead.
In the televised speech below, President Barack Obama announced just hours ago that following "a firefight," U.S. forces "killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body." The "targeted operation" was carried out, on Obama's orders, at a compound in Abbottabad, a city 150 miles north of Pakistan's capital. The President said that no Americans nor any civilians were harmed. (IntLawGrrl Beth Van Schaack's legal analysis of this operation is here.)
The killing ended a struggle against bin Laden that had been waged not only by Obama, but also by his two predecessors. It dated to well before 9/11: As early as 1998, the Department of Justice indicted bin Laden on charges relating to bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, and President Bill Clinton authorized the CIA to get him. Back then, few knew of al Qaeda or bin Laden. 9/11 changed all that.
Today, bin Laden is dead.
But what of al Qaeda? Will decapitation bring it too to an end? Or has the network, in reality or metaphor, so metastasized that bin Laden's death does little to alter 21st C. geopolitics?
And what of counterterrorism? What next in Afghanistan? If tensions should ease, will a recalibration of liberty and security ensue?
These questions and more we must ponder, even as we grasp for "the sense of unity" to which Obama hearkened.



(Cross-posted at The Huffington Post)

Friday, April 22, 2011

'Nuff said

(Taking context-optional note of thought-provoking quotes)

The victim, Mukhataran Mai, hit world headlines after speaking out about her ordeal in 2002. She has since become an icon for women's rights in Pakistan.
She said she now feared for her life.

--The BBC, in an article reporting on a decision yesterday in which Pakistan's Supreme Court acquitted all but one of "six men charged over a village council-sanctioned gang rape" committed against Mai (center), about whom IntLawGrrl Karen E. Bravo has posted. (2005 photo credit; thanks to California-Davis law student Baber Khan for notice of this judgment)


Sunday, March 20, 2011

...and counting...

(Occasional sobering thoughts.) The United States, France, and other countries intervened militarily against Libya's government yesterday -- the 8th anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
Participation by France (under President Nicolas Sarkozy) departed from the earlier script, when France (under President Jacques Chirac) vocally opposed intervention and so thwarted the United States' bid for U.N. Security Council authorization.
This time around, France pushed earlier and hard for a Security Council resolution. Some officials in the United States initially resisted. But as predicted nearly a month ago by our Opinio Juris colleague Chris Borgen, a tweet heard 'round the world (below center, by Anne-Marie Slaughter, who just finished a 2-year stint as the head of policy planning at the State Department) seemed to set the stage for support by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and, eventually, President Barack Obama.


Five of the 15 Security Council states, including China, Russia, and Germany, abstained from Resolution 1973, which was billed as a no-fly resolution during early negotiations, yet included this paragraph authorizing greater intervention:
Protection of civilians
4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council; ....

Hence yesterday's Tomahawk strikes on Libyan air defense systems. Hence, too, today's complaint from an advocate of the no-fly zone -- the leader of the Arab League said "the use of force was excessive following an overnight bombing campaign that Libya claims killed at least 48 people."
The Security Council-endorsed actions are taking place in the name of civilians. A noble cause, yet one without end. If Libya, why not other countries whose governments harm their own people? To name one, why not Côte d'Ivoire, site of tragic deaths amid months-long post-election violence?
As made explicit in the preamble to Resolution 1973, the Security Council resolved to act in the name of the fledgling doctrine of responsibility to protect. The Council's choice of Libya, to the exclusion of other global trouble spots, exposes once again the unsettling selection bias inherent in current conceptualizations of that doctrine.
Unsettling too is the notion of a 3d (or 4th, depending on how one counts AfPak) armed conflict in which the United States is engaged -- and in which civilian deaths are likely to occur even in the course of efforts to protect civilians.
While waiting to see what transpires on the Libyan front, it is due time to review casualties since our last post, 16 weeks ago, in the long-running conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
► In Afghanistan, "[t]argeted killings of civilians in Afghanistan doubled" in 2010, according to an annual report recently issued by the United Nations. Specifically, there was "a 15 percent increase in the number of civilians killed to 2,777 -- continuing a steady rise over the past four years" in the nearly decade-old conflict.
The U.S. Department of Defense reports that in Afghanistan, coalition military casualties stand at 1,505 Americans, 360 Britons, and 507 other coalition servicemembers. That's an increase of 89, 15, and 23 casualties, respectively, in the last 16 weeks. The total coalition casualty count in the Afghanistan conflict is 2,372 service women and men.
► Respecting the Iraq War launched 8 years ago this weekend -- a milestone observed by scattered protests --Iraq Body Count reports that between 100, 051 and 109,318 Iraqi women, children, and men have died in the conflict in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. That represents an increase of between 1,030 and 1,224 persons since 16 weeks ago. According to the U.S. Defense Department, 4,440 American servicemembers have been killed in Iraq, representing 11 servicemember deaths in the last 16 weeks. (As posted, U.S. troops are the only foreign forces remaining in Iraq.)

Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Climate consensus-building

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute this guest post)

Sustained cooperation on climate change is within political reach, this I believe.
International treaties are seldom accomplished inside a day. At its core, the Cancun Agreements adopted during the recent 2-week conference in that Mexican city (prior IntLawGrrls post) set forth these objectives:
► Greenhouse gas mitigation by all countries;
► An Adaptation Framework;
► A Technology Transfer Mechanism to facilitate environmentally sound technology- and capacity-building;
► A new U.N. Green Climate Fund;
► Measurable, reportable, and verifiable inspections for the United States, China, and other major emitting countries;
► Scientific review after five years; and
► Forestry consensus to fund countries to avert deforestation.
There could not have been a greater contrast between Cancun and Copenhagen, the 2009 conference on which IntLawGrrls posted here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.
In the frozen northern city creativity abounded -- gaining the spotlight. Civil society spelled out "350" holding blazing torches in the snow.
In the southern city, demonstrations were displaced by armed forces, keeping the most recent U.N. climate change conference – known by its acronym COP 16 – a high-end diplomatic affair. Surreal resorts along Cancun's Maya Riviera hosted subdued forums patching back together trust in multilateral climate cooperation. Countries are "now walking in the right direction, but they need to start running," Tim Gore of Oxfam International noted.
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called upon the international community to "think big, connecting the dots between poverty, energy, food, water, environmental pressure and climate change."
The floods in Pakistan and fires in Russia are the latest bells tolling an alarming wake-up call. It brings to mind these famous words, written by the poet John Donne in 1624:

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were: any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.
The spoken and unspoken calls of children, women, and men – of terrestrial and marine life are coalescing. Time will not gain patience – we must channel the urgency into collective action to address climate change. "You have been negotiating all my life. You cannot tell us that you need more time," Christina Ora of the Solomon Islands, challenged a collection of 193 countries. (credit for photo of Ora speaking during COP 15)
I have participated in these negotiations since 1991, helping to draft the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The goal is still elusive, but this 1992 Convention has 194 parties, who meet annually.
All eyes are on Durban, South Africa, where COP 17 will be held from November 28 to December 9, 2011. (image credit) There we may yet weave together international consensus for a post-2012 framework to mitigate, adapt, innovate, and fund a meaningful transnational climate response.
As Gandhi noted, we must be the change that we wish to see in the world.

Monday, December 20, 2010

Kosovo: Secession dilemma déjà-vu

(Many thanks to IntLawGrrls for giving me the opportunity to contribute this guest post!)

Since 17 February 2008 – the day of Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – it has become rather pressing to understand whether this act has legal precedential value and hence what its consequences are. The International Court of Justice (below right) issued an Advisory Opinion on Kosovo this past summer. (Prior IntLawGrrls posts available here.) But that opinion has not shed much, if any, light on the question of precedence.
Whether the Court was asked, on the one hand, to analyze the legal consequences of the independence of Kosovo, or, on the other hand, merely to “narrow[ly] and specific[ally]” reply whether “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law,” remains, of course, a separate debate.
Be it as it may, the dilemma remains:

Is Kosovo a precedent for (remedial) secession?
My article recently published in the Goettingen Journal of International Law, "Secession in Theory and Practice: The Case of Kosovo and Beyond," attempts to put forward a lucid account of the legal implications of Kosovo’s independence. To do so, the article explores the international regulations on secession, as well as the circumstances that led to the case at hand.
The paper carves out the place of secession in international law by appeal to fundamental principles and legal doctrine, and concludes:
► There is no general jus secedendi, or right to secede.
► There are instances in which a right to secession is recognized under international law. These refer to states explicitly acknowledging a right to secession in their domestic law, or multinational states recognizing that their constituent peoples have the right to self-determination.
► There is one controversial case that divides scholarship, the one of remedial secession.
► Lastly, there is a trend towards the legality principle governing secessions, as distinguished from the traditional neutrality doctrine.
It is useful to consider the theory on secession with state practice, to the extent that such practice can be discerned from major socio-political events of Kosovo’s history – from the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 to Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) that set up the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). From the juxtaposition of this theory and practice, a second conclusion can be drawn: Kosovo is a case of remedial secession and thus it represents a potential legal precedent.
And yet the exceptionality discourse!
While the elements of remedial secession are gathered, states deprived this instance of practice of its precedential value, and made it a legally insignificant act.
Some explanations are in order.
An action that is novel or inconsistent with current practice gains precedential value if other states accept it; acquiescence and protest are the fundamental state reactions to an action, therefore those are of interest in the case of Kosovo. Serbia, as the state with most interest in resolving the Kosovo case, has strongly protested against the legality of Kosovo’s secession. Other states protested or decided to withhold recognition. All officially identify the potential of setting a legal precedent as reasoning.
The fascination about the Kosovo case lies in the discourse of those states that chose to support and recognize Kosovo as an independent state, describing it as a sui generis/special/exceptional case. Throughout the years that it has sought independence from Serbia, Kosovo has maintained that it has the legal right to do so. In this context, the most staggering statement is made by Kosovo itself in its own declaration of independence:

Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation.
The Kosovo secession has been articulated, but as a non-precedential situation. In the end, as scholars Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust wrote in an article published last year,

states are both subjected to international law and create and authoritatively interpret it.
And in this case, even the recognizing states have consciously and clearly opted not to create a general rule governing remedial secession. Ultimately, states have guarded the status quo, and continued to act allergic to a right to remedial secession with set boundaries and clear coordinates. Ironically, the consistent state practice is evidence of the absence of a customary right of remedial secession.
In other words, the international community missed a rare opportunity to clarify the concept of remedial secession and to reassert its preventive force as a non-traditional human rights protection mechanism. The consequences of not assuming the precedent are, regrettably, far more important.
The force of remedial secession lies in its prevention potential – empowering minority groups to hold governments accountable to their international obligations. It is not an implosive weapon within the Westphalian system, but rather a non-traditional human rights mechanism.
By presenting Kosovo as unique, the international community undermined the theory of remedial secession, and made states and their borders sacrosanct even when a government, by way of its discriminatory and repressive actions against part of its population, puts its own raison d’être into question. It is a perverse implication, one that states will have to deal with when another unique Kosovo enters the international arena.
Thirty-nine years ago, Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan. The debate whether Bangladesh set a precedent for a right to remedial secession continues. Regrettably, Kosovo is merely a Bangladeshi déjà-vu.

Sunday, November 21, 2010

On drones

The United States is putting on the pressure to expand the scope of U.S. drone operations, but getting nowhere, according to reports published in the last couple days.
For readers trying to figure out this hot-button global issue, there's The International Law of Drones, a new ASIL Insight by IntLawGrrl guest/alumna Mary Ellen O'Connell (prior posts).
In the Insight, Mary Ellen traces the history of unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, as drones officially are called. (UAV photo credit; O'Connell photo credit)
Then she describes how they've been used as weapons -- since the 1st U.S. attack, launched from Djibouti into Yemen, in 2002 -- through to current deployment at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Next she tries to fit the issues surrounding such uses into the framework of international law respecting the use of force; that is, term-of-art concepts such as "armed conflict," "armed attack," and "self-defense."
Finally, Mary Ellen points to a need for greater research, particularly on the psychological effects that drone warfare has on those who wage it.
Well worth a read.

Monday, October 4, 2010

Where is the Zone of Combat?

(My thanks to IntLawGrrls for the opportunity to contribute this guest post)

Battlefield.
Combat area.
Theater of operations.
These traditional terms in military discourse and the modern English language have described wartime areas for decades – indeed centuries. In today’s conflicts, states fight against nonstate actors and terrorist groups that are unbounded by sovereign territorial boundaries and that prefer tactics aimed at civilians often far from any traditionally understood battlefield. Those facts can easily confound attempts to use these existing terms effectively.
In particular, the present conflict between the United States and al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups poses significant yet seemingly fundamental questions, not only about the law applicable to operations against terrorists, but also about where the conflict is taking place and where that law applies. Beyond the obvious areas of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the border areas of Pakistan, there is, at present, little agreement on where the battlefield is – i.e., where this conflict is taking place – and an equal measure of uncertainty regarding when it started and when and how it might end. (credit for photo of memorial following 2008 attack in Mumbai, India)
Many practitioners and scholars now suggest that the traditional battlefield – once populated by tank battles and infantry – has been replaced by a more complex environment, sometimes called the zone of combat. Blending armed conflict and operational counterterrorism, the zone of combat has been characterized as anywhere terrorist attacks are taking place, or perhaps even being planned and financed. Even when not conceived of as broadly, the zone of combat encompasses areas beyond the traditional battlefield and could likely include any area where military responses to terrorists and terrorist attacks take place.
The “zone of combat” may simply seem to be yet another modern descriptive term that offers a clearer representation of real life than its antecedent. But it raises important and interesting legal questions. The fact that the zone of combat is movable and changeable only complicates the nature of these questions.
When many argue – and the United States consistently asserts – that the United States in engaged in a global war against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, one natural question is where is the battlefield, or zone of combat, in this global struggle against terrorist groups? And how do we identify it?
I explore these questions in an article in the forthcoming volume of the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, entitled “Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat.”
These questions of where and when are critical for understanding how to apply the law to questions of targeting, detention, interrogation, direct participation in hostilities, and trials, among others. Just as relevant legal frameworks help us understand the substantive scope of the applicable law within the zone of combat, those frameworks can help illuminate its temporal and geographic scope.
Traditional conceptions of belligerency and neutrality do not effectively address the complex spatial and temporal nature of terrorist attacks and states' responses. Nor can human rights law or domestic criminal law, which are both legal regimes of general applicability, offer a useful means for defining where a state can conduct military operations against terrorist groups.
In contrast, the law of armed conflict – naturally limited and triggered by the existence of an armed conflict – provides a framework not only for when it applies, but where and for how long. By using this framework and analogizing relevant factors and considerations to the conflict with al Qaeda, we can identify factors that can help define the zone of combat.
► First, some terrorist attacks and activities fall closer to the traditional conception of hostilities as understood within the law of armed conflict. Areas where these types of attacks occur naturally have a stronger link to a battlefield. In addition, when such attacks or activities occur regularly or over a defined time period, we can more clearly define the temporal parameters of the zone of combat as well.
► Second, in declaring that it is “at war with terrorists,” a state may envision the whole world as a battlefield. But the state’s actual conduct in response to the threat posed offers a more accurate lens through which to view the battlefield. Areas where the state uses military force, particularly multiple facets of military power, on a regular or recurring basis, should fall within the zone of combat while those where the state chooses diplomatic or law enforcement measures, or relies such efforts by another state, do not demonstrate the characteristics of the battlefield. This same analysis holds true for the temporal parameters as well.
Applying this type of analysis in a simplistic manner does indeed leave room for abuse by states, which might overuse military power merely to try to squeeze otherwise non-battlefield areas within the zone of combat. While this is certainly a consideration, government response is only one factor to take into account in assessing the parameters of the zone of combat and both the nature of the international community and the great expense, both human and material, of applying military might where not necessary will likely weigh against any such abuse.
►The third factor – territory – requires the most creative application. Terrorist groups do not use or connect to territory in the same manner as either states or non-state actors seeking to gain power or independence. Conflicts against terrorist groups, as a result, do not follow the boundaries on a map or the dictates of state sovereignty or international legal niceties. But territory can be a contributing factor to a paradigm defining the zone of combat nonetheless.
Looking at territory from a new angle, we can see that terrorists use certain areas for safe havens and training camps and identify certain areas as prime targets for repeated attacks. Those territorial areas must therefore have a stronger connection to the zone of combat than others, both geographically and temporally, because the way terrorists use particular areas will naturally change over time.
Taken as a whole and considered in light of existing jurisprudence and policy considerations, these analytical tools form a first step in the critical task of identifying where and when a state can conduct operations within an armed conflict framework. Such identification is a necessary companion to the ongoing debate about whether and how a state can conduct operations within such a framework.

Saturday, September 11, 2010

On 9/11, Remembering the Other’s Others: International Law & Muslim Fundamentalism

The ninth anniversary of September 11, 2001, finds the international community still grappling with the consequences of that terrible day.
Armed conflicts which began in the wake of 9/11 continue in Afghanistan and Iraq, spilling over now into Pakistan and Yemen with often devastating consequences for civilians. Human rights abuses in the “war on terror” remain largely unpunished, but will never be forgotten around the world. Xenophobia directed against Muslims serves as a useful tool for right-wing politicians in the West. And you may have heard that an idiot in Florida has been trying to decide whether or not he will burn hundreds of Qur’ans today.
At the same time, Muslim fundamentalist armed movements akin to those that perpetrated 9/11, like the various permutations of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, or Al Shabab in Somalia or Boko Haram in Nigeria, just to name a few, continue to pose major challenges to human rights in Muslim majority societies and around the world. For a terrifying insight into the worldview of defenders of such movements, see here.
Muslim fundamentalist armed movements often kill civilians indiscriminately, as they did on 9/11, a day to which Al Qaeda chillingly refers as “Holy Tuesday.” They also target artists, writers and freethinkers for assassination, and purvey systematic discrimination against women and religious minorities and LGBT individuals. They seek to impose their version of the Sharia on all Muslims everywhere – this often means advocating practices like stoning women for adultery. (credit for logo at right of the Global Campaign to Stop Stoning) Hence, such movements pose particular threats to international law in the areas of human rights, humanitarian law and conflict prevention, inter alia.
My article “Remembering the Other’s Others: Theorizing the Approach of International Law to Muslim Fundamentalism,” published this summer in the Columbia Human Rights Law Review, challenges international lawyers to develop a critical analysis of Muslim fundamentalist movements and to support the many Muslim human rights defenders battling fundamentalism.
Faced with the current polarized environment, this enterprise is unquestionably a daunting task, and I see the already constricted space for my argument narrowing further. Muslim fundamentalists – and those confused with them – have also themselves been the targets of a range of grave violations of international law by states in recent years, like torture. Racialized discourses and policies directed against people of Muslim heritage have proliferated since September 11, 2001, and are currently experiencing a particularly disturbing revival – what might be called hatredofmuslims version 20.10.
All of this fuels more fundamentalism.
Despite these real difficulties, offering a critical perspective on the contemporary problem of Muslim fundamentalism remains an essential project for international lawyers. As a discipline we in international law have mostly engaged critically with the (admittedly problematic) responses to Muslim fundamentalism, rather than with the phenomenon itself.
► Can we offer an accurate or useful commentary on the responses to Muslim fundamentalist movements if we overlook their existence and impact in the first place?
► Of what use is our critique of the “war on terror” if we are largely silent about one side of that “war”?
In fact, the failure of learned discourse in the United States – including in the field of international law – to name and thoughtfully explain the problem of Muslim fundamentalism actually risks facilitating discrimination against Muslims in general. This omission obscures the fact that contemporary terrorism and the “war on terror” actually revolve around a very specific set of politics and political actors, not around broader religious denominations or religious claims.
Ordinary Muslims or the Muslim religion as a whole must not be confused with specific fundamentalist movements and their adherents, just as most American Christians would not want to be identified with Christian fundamentalist Terry Jones. Yet, the mere critique of Muslim fundamentalist movements themselves is not per se an expression of anti-Muslim bias, just as criticism of the pyromaniacally inclined Pastor Jones is not an attack on Christianity. This, I fear, is a fact that is likely to get lost in the current cacophony.
Actually, Muslim fundamentalist armed groups’ primary victims, as the 2006 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism acknowledged, are often other people of Muslim heritage. Hence, defending the human rights of Muslims means successfully defeating fundamentalism (and vice versa).
In the contemporary period, Western discourse, including in the field of international law, has sometimes seemed to offer only two choices: the openly discriminatory or flawed characterization (Islam is inherently fundamentalist, all Muslims are fundamentalists and so on), or the one that is too politically correct to even broach the topic of fundamentalism. Neither one is helpful or accurate. What we need is a principled, human rights based critique of Muslim fundamentalism, alongside a principled, human rights based critique of discrimination against Muslims. To paraphrase a brilliant Pakistani colleague, I reject the idea that my choices are limited to accepting either Glenn Beck or the Sharia, and I reserve my right to criticize both. I utterly reject both the would be suicide bombers and the would be Qur’an burners, and neither one can ever justify the actions of the other.
Returning to today’s sad anniversary, I honor the memory of all the 2,976 victims of September 11. They were women, men and children who came from more than 90 countries, from many religious, racial and ethnic backgrounds, and from all walks of life. All are mourned by family and friends. In the current moment, I think about Amenia Rasool (left), a Guyanan-American Muslim woman who worked on the 95th floor of the World Trade Center. (photo credit) I first read about her in The New York Times remembrance section.
I am humbled by the thought of such a terrible death at the hands of Muslim fundamentalists, and compelled by the beautiful complexity of Amenia Rasool’s existence, a life which challenged all simple narratives about what it means to be a Muslim woman in America. Though she had an arranged marriage, she and her husband reportedly shared domestic tasks. She worked as an accountant by day, but in the evening when her chores were done, she was said to enjoy watching taped soap operas and painting her fingernails. All of these things – women working outside the home, dramatic entertainment and use of cosmetics are often prohibited by fundamentalists – sometimes on penalty of death. Meanwhile, many American right-wing racists cannot conceive of a Muslim woman with such a life, nor do those who wave hateful signs in protest against the proposed Muslim community center in Lower Manhattan (“No Islamic Settlements in America”) remember her, even in death. She would have been “the other” to some of these Americans, but was also “the other” for Muslim fundamentalists. It is this complex, multidirectional dynamic that I am trying to name with the title of my article, “Remembering the Other’s Others.”
I am hoping that human rights advocates will remember Amenia Rasool when they conceive of what human rights means in relation to September 11th and its aftermath. This means taking violence by nonstate actors – as well as by states – seriously, as I underscored in my September 11, 2008, post,"Terror/Torture." This means being relentless in demanding accountability for those surviving persons involved in such terrorist atrocities and for the atrocities of response that have followed. This means that we must face up to the menace of Muslim fundamentalism, while (and as one means of) staunchly defending the human rights of Muslims in the United States and beyond. (credit for 2009 photo of protest against Sudanese prosecution of Lubna Hussein for wearing pants)
The task of human rights, it seems to me, must be to create an international community that recognizes the complexity of a life story like Rasool’s, and that protects the Amenia Rasools of the world from all of the kinds of discrimination and coercion and horror and violence they can face – as women, as Muslims, as immigrants, as Americans, as civilians, as people who live these categories as overlapping and intersecting rather than opposing. Rasool left behind four children when she was murdered by Al Qaeda. Let us hope we can make that better world in their lifetime.
A few nights ago, I walked along the Hudson River, transfixed by the beams of the Tribute in Light, streaming upward where the Twin Towers used to stand, in commemoration of the approaching anniversary. (credit for 2009 photo, top left) The powerful illumination filled the sky where the most extreme Muslim fundamentalists had blown a terrible empty hole nine years ago. Despite that grave international crime, and all that has followed, for me these beams of light still reflect the simple promise that we human beings can do better in how we treat one another.

Sunday, August 29, 2010

Pitching in for Pakistan

The floods in Pakistan have rendered a reported 20 million homeless, destroyed an estimated 1.7 million acres of crops leading to the threat of famine, and given rise to an epidemic of diseases such as cholera, dengue, and malaria. Yet like the water itself, the crisis seems to have snuck up on the international community.
The Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan, prepared immediately after the flood, requested $459 million primarily for food, water, sanitation and hygiene, health, shelter and other non-food items. The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) reports that $274 million has been raised, thus reaching a coverage of 59.6%. Despite an outcry that the international community is leaving Pakistan in the lurch, this is actually a fairly high number. The FTS also reports that other disasters this year, such as the civil unrest in Kyrgyzstan or tropical storm that hit Guatemala, have only been covered to the tune of 36% and 33% respectively. But there's no denying that the international community seems less concerned with Pakistan than it was with say, Haiti. The Chronicle of Philanthropy reports that while twenty-two U.S. aid groups have raised a total of $9.9-million for Pakistan, within two-and-a-half weeks of the earthquake, 40 aid groups had brought in a total of $560-million for Haiti. (photo credit, above).
Why? Well, in the UK it is being blamed on persistent negative images of Pakistan in the media and elsewhere. In India, the history of poor neighborly behavior has led to India's refusal to provide aid. And in the U.S., the low death toll, "summer vacation doldrums," and donor fatigue after the Haiti disaster are thought to contribute to the lack of interest in the crisis.
But the stakes are high. As an editorial in the New York Times last week put it:
The world, especially the United States, must not blow this one.
The editorial reminds us that Pakistan is armed with nuclear weapons, after all, and its destabilization could spell disaster. Moreover, the United States has put an awful lot of effort into suppressing Al Qaeda in the region, particularly along the border with Afghanistan. That work is easily undermined when radical Islamic charities are able to provide shelter and food ahead of the authorities or foreign aid organizations. The Pakistani Taliban has inserted itself, urging the Pakistani government not to accept aid at all, citing a need to maintain sovereignty and independence. The strategic implications (read: politics) of it all are hard to avoid. (photo credit, above left; photo credit below right)
While the rhetoric that this is a "battle for hearts and minds" strikes me as overly dramatic, maintaining peace and security in Pakistan through the crisis is an unquestionable must. And to the extent that it is a battle for hearts and minds, an outpouring of support from the international community ought to do the trick. Pakistan is facing a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. Angelina Jolie gets it. She recently donated $100,000 of her personal funds to help. You can too. But don't worry, the minimum amount is only $15.

Sunday, June 27, 2010

...and counting....

(Occasional sobering thoughts.) It's been fully 14 weeks since we last took account of the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
The headline news this past week, of course, has been President Barack Obama's firing of U.S. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal from command of forces in Afghanistan. The Oval Office dismissal came days after the online publication of spoken, and gestured, criticisms by McChrystal and his staff, the crudeness of which reads as a juvenile and downright dumb effort by military brass to out-Rolling Stone the Rolling Stone. (Perhaps if they'd seen the Gaga cover that would cloak the McChrystal story, they'd have known the futility of any such effort.)
Also seizing headlines was Obama's in-an-instant replacement of McChrystal with Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq from 2007 to 2008.
But neither seems the real story.
More likely, the real story is Obama's insistence that no change in war-waging policy would accompany the change in war-waging generals:
We are going to break the Taliban's momentum. We are going to build Afghan capacity. We are going to relentlessly apply pressure on al-Qaida and its leadership, strengthening the ability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan to do the same.
Whether that's in fact the last word on policy remains to be seen.
On her 1st day in office Friday, Julia Gillard, the new Prime Minister of Australia, assured Obama in a phone conversation that "supports the war in Afghanistan and he can rely on her to continue the commitment of troops." (credit for 2009 photo of Gillard, then Deputy Prime Minister, visiting Australian troops in Iraq shortly before their withdrawal from that country)
Yet in the country contributing the most troops after the United States to the NATO effort in Afghanistan, the news of the week was the 300th British servicemember death there. Not surprisingly, yesterday the new Prime Minister, David Cameron, sounded a rather more measured tone after meeting with Obama on the 1st day of this week's G-20 summit in Toronto. Cameron said:

Making progress this year, putting everything we have into getting it right this year is vitally important.
Criticism of the tactics of the AfPak war also persist, as was evident in the attention paid the public defense of targeted-killing-by-drones, delivered in March by State Department Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh. Four persons were killed in a drone raid yesterday, another 13 last week; "Pakistani officials have told the BBC that the US have carried out at least 70 such raids since January."
Also of concern, the continued spike in civilian deaths, a trend that Obama's promised to work to reverse:
Figures from the Pentagon show 90 civilians were killed by American or NATO forces in the first four months of this year, compared with 51 in the same period last year ...
As for Iraq?
Far less news. About a hundred persons killed by car bombs in May, on the "bloodiest day this year." More recently, reports of scattered violence "as," to quote The New York Times, "as the country’s political stalemate dragged on."
With these developments in mind, we revisit the casualty count since our last "...and counting..." post 6 weeks ago:
► The U.S. Department of Defense reports that coalition military casualties in Afghanistan stand at 1,141 Americans, 308 Britons, and 425 other coalition servicemembers. That's an increase of 117, 43, and 32 casualties, respectively, in the last 14 weeks. The total coalition casualty count in the Afghanistan conflict is 1,874 service women and men.
► Respecting the conflict in Iraq, Iraq Body Count reports that between 96,813 and 105,563 Iraqi women, children, and men have died in the conflict in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, representing an increase of between 1,089 and 1,136 deaths in the last 14 weeks.
According to the U.S. Defense Department, 4,408 American servicemembers have been killed in Iraq, representing 23 servicemember deaths in the last 14 weeks. (As posted, U.S. troops are the only foreign forces remaining in Iraq.)

Friday, March 26, 2010

Koh on targeted killing

There was much worth pondering in the keynote speech that Harold Hongju Koh (center left), since last June the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, delivered yesterday at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law.
'Grrls will be posting on various aspects of that talk and others in short order. But we can't let a day go by without posting his remarks on unmanned aerial vehicles, better known as UAVs or drones (pictured below).
A few hours before Koh's speech, IntLawGrrls guest/alumna Mary Ellen O'Connell, newly elected an ASIL Vice President, had chaired a well-attended panel on the issue. Mary Ellen, who'd written a Balkinization post in support of Koh's nomination about this time last year, last December contributed an IntLawGrrls post outlining her legal concerns about the United States' use of drones in the AfPak conflict to target for killing persons believed to be al Qaeda operatives.
Thanks to ASIL's Sheila R. Ward, we set forth verbatim relevant quotes from Koh's speech, which you can watch in the video clip here.
Koh, formerly the Yale Law Dean and an ASIL Counsellor, maintained that such use is legal, essentially embracing the "war" paradigm that many others have challenged. He stated:

[I]t is the considered view of this administration … that targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war…
As recent events have shown, Al Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks….
He then detailed how "this administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles"; specifically:

► First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and
► Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Koh endeavored to assure his audience that in

U.S. operations against al Qaeda and its associated forces – including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles – great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.
Addressing critics of the policy, he continued:

[S]ome have suggested that the very use of targeting a particular leader of an enemy force in an armed conflict must violate the laws of war. But individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerent and, therefore, lawful targets under international law....
[S]ome have challenged the very use of advanced weapons systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for lethal operations. But the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system involved, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict – such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs – so long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war….
[S]ome have argued that the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force.

[On this boldfaced statement, consider the rather different view in my post above, which reprints a passage, from my 2006 article, that recounts Justice John Paul Stevens' concerns regarding a targeted killing in which he and other Navy codebreakers played a role -- the killing in 1943 of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, architect of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.]
Koh maintained that due precautions are taken even without the interposition of due process:

Our procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to make our targeting even more precise. In my experience, the principles of distinction and proportionality that the United States applies are not just recited at meeting. They are implemented rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are conducted in accordance with all applicable law….

Finally, Koh cited domestic law as an independent justification:

[S]ome have argued that our targeting practices violate domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems – consistent with the applicable laws of wear – for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination.’

Monday, December 7, 2009

Drones and the Law: What We Know

(IntLawGrrls is pleased to welcome back alumna Mary Ellen O'Connell, who contributes this guest post)

The New York Times reported last week that the U.S. would be increasing its drone strikes into Pakistan. The article attributes the following comment to Philip Alston:
it is impossible to judge whether the program violates international law without knowing whether Pakistan permits the incursions, how targets are selected and what is done to minimize civilian casualties.

Alston’s job as UN special rapporteur for extrajudicial executions is to get this information. It makes sense for him to state his concerns in a form designed to entice cooperation from the United States.
But international lawyers already have sufficient information to draw conclusions about the legality of drone use in Pakistan. We know first and foremost that the use of drones to fire missiles and drop bombs is only lawful during actual hostilities of armed conflict — drones are a war-fighting tool, not a law-enforcement tool. (photo credit) Yet, many U.S. attacks have occurred when there has been no fighting in Pakistan. During the last nine months when there has been fighting, few U.S. strikes have been of assistance to Pakistan.
Pakistani intelligence services or the military have apparently cooperated with the United States on strikes, but under international law, it should be the elected civilian officials who provide a state’s consent for foreign military operations. The New York Times article quoted the Pakistani Prime Minister as saying

the drone strikes 'do no good, because they boost anti-American resentment throughout the country.'

The United States should not be undermining civilian control in Pakistan by failing to seek the consent of civilian authorities. Nor should we settle for less than express, public consent that cannot later be denied.
We also know CIA operatives are carrying out the strikes in Pakistan, not the U.S. military. CIA operatives, however, are not part of the United States' armed forces. They do not wear uniforms, are not in the chain of command, and are not trained in the law of armed conflict. They have no right to kill in combat.
And we know that in the attempt to kill about a dozen individuals on the CIA’s "kill" list 80-some strikes have been carried out and almost 800 persons have been killed. Yet, killing suspected leaders has little long-term impact on militant organizations in a context like Pakistan. If a military objective cannot be achieved, killing violates the principle of military necessity.
A CIA spokesman quoted in the Times article says that it is "flat-out false" that hundreds of civilians have been killed by CIA strikes. But we know that the CIA has little, if any information about its victims. In such situations, the principle of humanity requires that we assume persons are civilians, not fighters. Law enforcement methods must be used against civilians, not the war-fighting mechanism of the unmanned drone. Killing many civilians in the attempt to kill a single fighter violates the principle of proportionality.
In sum, we know plenty.


(For a more detailed analysis of the law on drones, see my article entitled Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones.")